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I
n a long-awaited move, Congress enacted leg-
islation last fall authorizing full interstate bank-
ing. While most states had already acted to
allow some form of entry by outside holding com-
panies, the new law was expected to hasten the
spread of large multi-office banking organizations.
Most analysts believe the change will benefit the
public by increasing competition, improving ser-
vices to depositors, and reducing banks’ vulnerabil-
ity to local downturns. 
Concern has been voiced, however, that the
benefits of multi-office banking may be achieved at
the expense of small businesses. Specifically, some
analysts worry that large multi-office banks will be
less able or less willing to lend to small businesses
than the smaller banks they replace. Such a decline
in small business lending could have serious conse-
quences, these analysts argue, because small busi-
nesses account for a major share of job creation and
lack alternative sources of financing.
This article investigates the relationship be-
tween multi-office banking and small business
lending using new information on small business
loans in Tenth District states. Data for mid-1994
show that branch banks, smaller banks in multibank
holding companies, and banks owned by out-of-
state companies all tend to lend a smaller proportion
of their funds to small businesses than other banks.
These results support the view that further growth
in multi-office banking may impose short-run costs
on some small businesses. The article cautions,
though, against concluding that multi-office banking
should be curtailed. Instead, regulators should con-
tinue to ensure that local banking markets remain
competitive, so other banks can step in and fill any
gaps in the legitimate credit needs of small businesses.
The first section of the article reviews the con-
troversy over the effects of multi-office banking on
small business lending. The second section de-
scribes the different forms of multi-office banking
in Tenth District states. The third section presents
the evidence on small business lending by multi-
office banks in the district. The article concludes
with a discussion of the policy implications.
THE CONTROVERSY OVER
MULTI-OFFICE BANKING AND SMALL
BUSINESS LENDING
While the advent of interstate banking has
heightened interest in the issue, the debate over the
effects of multi-office banking on small business
lending goes back many years. In the first half of
the century, the debate centered on differences in
the lending behavior of branch banks and “unit”
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holding company form of organization spread in the
1960s and 1970s, analysts debated whether banks
affiliated with multibank holding companies
(MBHCs) were less disposed to lend to small busi-
nesses than independent banks. More recently, as
states moved to allow some form of interstate bank-
ing in the 1980s, attention turned to differences in
lending behavior between in-state banks and banks
owned by out-of-state MBHCs. This section re-
views the effects these various forms of multi-office
banking might have on small business lending and
summarizes previous research.
Why multi-office banks might make fewer
small business loans  
Banking analysts have suggested several
reasons why large, multi-office banks might lend
less to small businesses than other banks.
1 One
reason is that large banks do not have to rely as
heavily on small borrowers to achieve a desired
level and composition of commercial lending.
Because loans to a single borrower cannot exceed
a certain percentage of a bank’s capital, small
banks are legally prohibited from making loans
above a certain size.
2 Also, given the limited funds
at their disposal, the only way small banks can
spread their risks sufficiently is by making a large
number of small loans. If small banks instead made
a small number of large loans, they would be more
vulnerable to bad luck on the part of a few cus-
tomers. Large banks do not have such concerns,
both because the single-borrower loan limit is not
binding for them and because they have enough
funds to make mostly large loans and still spread
their risks. 
Another reason large, multi-office banks might
make fewer small business loans is that they tend to
have long lines of managerial control. According to
this view, it is not feasible for the top managers of
a large bank to review every lending decision on
small loans, especially when the bank’s offices are
dispersed over a wide area. As a result, the large
bank’s loan officers are given less autonomy than
their counterparts at smaller banks and are required
to follow rigid rules in granting credit—for example,
rules about the minimum collateral on the loan or
net worth of the borrower. These rigid lending rules
result in fewer loans being granted to small busi-
nesses by large multi-office banks.
Finally, some critics of multi-office banks argue
that such banks make fewer small business loans
because they often “siphon” deposits from the banks
they acquire. According to this view, large banks
take over smaller banks in distant markets with the
aim of using the acquired banks’ deposits to fund
their own loan customers. Because large banks lend
mainly to large businesses and small banks to small
businesses, this redistribution of deposits decreases
total lending to small businesses.
Why multi-office banks might make more
small business loans
Not everyone agrees there is a natural tendency
for large multi-office banks to make fewer small
business loans. Such banks might even lend more
to small businesses than other banks because they
are more diversified and can borrow more easily on
the open market in the event of a liquidity crisis.
Greater diversification and access to the open
market enable large banks to invest more of their
funds in loans and less in safe, liquid assets like
government securities. The ability to invest a
higher proportion of funds in loans may result in
higher lending to all borrowers, including small
businesses.
Multi-office banks might also lend more to
small businesses because they are able to shift funds
from areas where loan demand is low to areas where
loan demand is high. In principle, the same redis-
tribution of funds could be achieved by small banks
in low-demand markets lending to small banks in
high-demand areas, either through the federal
funds market or a correspondent bank. In practice,
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funds among its own offices. Thus, to the extent
economic conditions vary across markets, total lend-
ing to small borrowers is likely to be higher for a
large bank with offices in many markets than for a
group of small independent banks located in the
same markets.
Finally, the removal of geographic barriers to
expansion may make it easier for large banks to lend
to small businesses. Such banks may have spe-
cialized in large business loans in the past, not
because they were any worse at making small
business loans, but because geographic barriers
confined them to large urban markets with mostly
large borrowers. If so, there should be nothing to
prevent large banks from making more small busi-
ness loans as they expand into smaller rural mar-
kets. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that large
banks have become more interested in small busi-
ness lending as competition from the capital mar-
kets has eroded the profitability of their large
business loans.
What previous studies show
Since valid arguments can be made on both
sides of the issue, the question whether multi-office
banking reduces small business lending can only be
resolved empirically. Unfortunately, research in this
area has been hampered by lack of suitable data.
Most studies have relied on the Reports of Condi-
tion and Income, or “call reports,” filed regularly by
commercial banks.
3 Until recently, these reports
included data on total loans and total business loans
but not on small business loans. 
Studies using call report data have found that
branch banks, banks owned by in-state MBHCs,
and banks owned by out-of-state MBHCs all tend
to lend a higher proportion of their deposits than
other banks.
4 Some studies have also found that
multi-office banks make more business loans,
although the results are less definitive than for
total loans.
5 Such findings support the claim that
multi-office banks’ diversification, access to open
market funds, and ability to shift funds between
markets allow them to lend more than other banks.
The studies do not reveal, however, whether small
businesses have benefited from this greater abil-
ity to lend.
A second group of studies based on survey data
have found a strong inverse relationship between
the size of bank and the proportion of funds loaned
to small business.
6 This finding is relevant because
the argument that multi-office banking reduces
small business lending is often based on the dual
claim that multi-office banking leads to bigger
banks and that bigger banks lend less to small
businesses. The finding is not conclusive, though,
because small banks that become part of larger
organizations may continue to behave like small
banks after acquisition.
Most relevant to this article are the small num-
ber of studies that have used survey data to directly
examine the effect of multi-office banking on small
business lending. While limited in scope, these
studies generally support the view that multi-office
banks lend less to small businesses. Recent surveys
have found that small businesses are more likely to
report their credit needs are unsatisfied if they are
located in markets dominated by multi-office
banks.
7 And early surveys of branch banks in New
England and New York found that out-of-town
branches made fewer unsecured loans to small busi-
nesses than unit banks in the same markets.
8 
Taken as a whole, previous research provides
limited support for the view that multi-office bank-
ing reduces small business lending. Studies based
on large samples of banks have found that total
lending is higher at large multi-office banks than at
other banks. But because these studies have relied
on call report data, they have been unable to distin-
guish small business loans from other types of
loans. Studies using survey data have generally
found that multi-office banks make fewer small
business loans than other banks. These studies are
only suggestive, however, because the surveys on
which they are based are dated or limited in scope.
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The controversy over multi-office banking and
small business lending has attracted increasing at-
tention in the Tenth District because district states
have recently loosened geographic restrictions on
bank expansion. Since the mid-1980s, all seven
district states have allowed statewide branching and
have passed laws allowing some form of entry by
out-of-state holding companies.
9 As a result, branch
banks and out-of-state MBHCs have joined in-state
MBHCs as important forms of multi-office banking
in the region.
Table 1 gives an idea how important branching
has become in each state and in the district as a
whole. In this article, the degree of branching at
each bank is measured by the percent of the bank’s
deposits held in branches outside the bank’s main
market. Markets are defined to include groups of
counties that are homogeneous in economic char-
acteristics.
10 A bank’s degree of branching is defined
as “low” if the percent of outside deposits is less
than 1 percent, “moderate” if the percent of outside
deposits is between 1 and 20 percent, and “high” if
the percent of outside deposits is greater than 20
percent.
Applying this definition to Tenth District states,
78 banks holding 17 percent of total deposits had a
moderate degree of branching in June 1994, while
99 banks holding 17 percent of total deposits had a
high degree of branching. Branching is most impor-
tant in Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wyo-
ming, the first four district states to allow statewide
Table 1
Distribution of Banks by Degree of Branching














Colorado 265 61 10 33 12 6
Kansas 437 71 17 4 22 25
Missouri 444 74 18 17 21 9
Nebraska 332 59 11 18 13 23
New Mexico 70 54 5 35 5 12
Oklahoma 317 64 16 6 23 31
W y o m i n g5 16 2 1 1 33 7
Tenth District
states 1,916 66 78 17 99 17
Note: For each bank, the degree of branching is defined as “low” if the share of deposits in branches outside the main
market is less than 1 percent; “moderate” if the share is between 1 and 20 percent; and “high” if the share is greater than
20 percent. See the text for the definition of markets.
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degree of branching accounted for more than a fifth
of total deposits in the state.
Table 2 provides similar information on the
importance of MBHCs in Tenth District states. For
purposes of this study, three classes of MBHC
banks can be distinguished: independent banks not
owned by a BHC or owned by a one-bank BHC,
banks owned by MBHCs with headquarters in the
same state, and banks owned by MBHCs with
headquarters outside of the state. 
According to these definitions, 494 district
banks holding 36 percent of total deposits were
owned by in-state MBHCs in June 1994, while 153
banks holding 21 percent of total deposits were
owned by out-of-state MBHCs. In-state MBHCs
are most important in Missouri, where they hold
three-quarters of deposits, and in Nebraska, where
they hold half of deposits. Out-of-state MBHCS are
most important in Colorado, New Mexico, and
Wyoming, accounting for almost three-fifths of
deposits in each of those states. Not surprisingly,
out-of-state MBHCs are much less important in
Kansas and Missouri, the two states that allow entry
only from neighboring states.
EVIDENCE ON SMALL BUSINESS
LENDING IN TENTH DISTRICT STATES
Do multi-office banks in Tenth District states
lend a smaller proportion of their funds to small
businesses than other banks? This section describes
a new source of data for answering the question and
then presents evidence on small business lending by
degree of branching and MBHC status. 
Data on small business lending 
New data on small business loans have recently
become available from bank call reports. Since
1993, banks have been required to report each June
the dollar amount of C&I loans outstanding in four
Table 2
Distribution of Banks by Holding Company Status
Tenth District states, June 1994
Independent banks
Banks owned by in-state
MBHCs














C o l o r a d o 1 4 62 68 61 65 55 8
Kansas 367 69 84 18 25 13
Missouri 303 32 169 76 11 1
Nebraska 258 40 94 49 4 11
New Mexico 47 37 6 5 27 58
Oklahoma 292 61 51 22 13 18
W y o m i n g3 33 2 4 81 85 9
Tenth District
states 1,446 42 494 36 153 21
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 49size categories—under $100,000, from $100,000 to
$250,000, from $250,000 to $1 million, and over $1
million.
11 While there is no exact relationship be-
tween the size of the loan and the size of the
borrower, previous surveys have shown a strong
correlation between the two. Accordingly, loans to
small businesses are approximated in this article by
C&I loans under $100,000.
12 Although data are
available for both 1993 and 1994, only 1994 data
are used since the more recent data are likely to be
more reliable.
13
Because the call report questions on loan size
were only recently introduced, the data cannot be
used for a “before-and-after” study of acquisitions
by multi-office banks. For now, the data can only
be used to examine the relationship between multi-
office banking and small business lending at a
single point in time. Such a “cross-section” ap-
proach can show whether large multi-office banks
lend less to small businesses than other banks. What
the approach cannot determine is whether such
differences exist because multi-office banks are less
suited to small business lending or because they
grew by acquiring banks that were already making
few such loans.
14
Small business lending by degree of
branching
The ideal way to determine the effect of branch-
ing on small business lending would be to compare
the ratio of small C&I loans to deposits at each
branch with the average loan-deposit ratio of simi-
lar size unit banks in the same market. Such an
approach is not feasible with existing data, how-
ever. While deposits are reported for each branch,
loans are reported only for the bank as a whole,
making it impossible to compute the loan-deposit
ratio of each branch. 
Since loan data are not available by branch, the
only way to determine the impact of branching on
small business lending is to compare the aggregate
loan-deposit ratio of each branch bank with the
average loan-deposit ratio of unit banks comparable
to the branches. This approach is followed in Table
3. The first column reports the average ratio of small
C&I loans to deposits in June 1994 for two groups
of branch banks—those with a moderate degree of
branching and those with a high degree of branch-
ing. The second column reports the average “peer”
ratios for the two groups. The peer ratio for each
Table 3
Average Ratio of Small C&I Loans to Deposits
Banks with moderate to high degree of branching
Degree of branching Average ratio Average peer ratio Average difference
Moderate 6.3 6.1 .3 
High 4.5 6.3 -1.8*
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note: For each bank, the peer ratio is the estimated mean loan-deposit ratio for comparable local banks with a low 
degree of branching. See text for further details.
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parable unit banks—unit banks operating in the
same markets as the bank’s branches, similar in size
to the bank’s branches, and having the same MBHC
status as the bank.
15 Finally, the third column shows
the difference between the two ratios. A negative
number indicates that the group lends less to small
business on average than comparable unit banks,
while a positive number indicates that the group
lends more on average than comparable unit banks.
Table 3 suggests that a moderate degree of
branching does not reduce small business lending
but that a high degree of branching does. The aver-
age loan-deposit ratio at banks with a moderate
degree of branching is slightly higher than at com-
parable unit banks—6.3 percent versus 6.1 percent.
In contrast, the average loan-deposit ratio at banks
with a high degree of branching is substantially
lower than at comparable unit banks—4.5 percent
versus 6.3 percent. The average difference of 1.8
percentage points between this group of branch
banks and comparable unit banks is also statistically
significant, in the sense of being too large to be
attributed to chance. 
While these results are informative, it is also
useful to know how widespread the tendency is for
the loan-deposit ratios of branch banks to differ
from those of comparable unit banks. For example,
do banks with a high degree of branching have a
lower average loan-deposit ratio than their peers
mainly because a few of them have extremely low
ratios that pull down the average for the group?
Table 4 helps answer such questions by showing the
percent of banks with higher ratios than comparable
unit banks and the percent with lower ratios.
16 
Table 4 points to three conclusions. First, as in
Table 3, there is little difference between banks with
a moderate degree of branching and comparable
unit banks. Among this first group of branch banks,
about half have higher ratios than their peers and
half have lower ratios. Second, the low average
loan-deposit ratio reported in Table 3 for banks with
a high degree of branching is not due to the influ-
ence of a few outliers but reflects a general tendency
for such banks to make fewer small business loans.
Among this second group of branch banks, the
number of banks with lower ratios than their peers
is more than double the number of banks with
higher ratios—a substantial difference. Finally,
while banks with a high degree of branching tend
Table 4
Distribution of Small C&I Loan-Deposit Ratio 






Moderate 49 51 
High 31 69 
Note: For each bank, the peer ratio is the estimated median loan-deposit ratio for comparable local banks with a low 
degree of branching. See text for further details.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 51to make fewer small business loans than compara-
ble unit banks, there are many exceptions to the rule.
The table shows that almost a third of banks with a
high degree of branching have higher loan-deposit
ratios than comparable unit banks. Thus, while most
branch banks in this group lend less to small busi-
ness than their peers, a sizable minority lend more
than their peers.
Small business lending by MBHC status
Because data on loans and deposits are avail-
able for each bank in a MBHC and not just the entire
organization, the effect of MBHC status on small
business lending can be determined more directly
than the effect of branching. Table 5 compares the
average loan-deposit ratio of three different groups
of MBHC banks with the loan-deposit ratio of
comparable independent banks. The three groups
are lead banks of in-state MBHCs, defined as banks
holding more than half of the MBHC’s total depos-
its; all other banks owned by in-state MBHCs; and
banks owned by out-of-state MBHCs.
17 The first
column shows the average loan-deposit ratio for
each group of MBHC banks in June 1994. The
second column shows the average loan-deposit ra-
tio at comparable independent banks—those of
similar size, location, and branching status.
18 The
last column shows the difference between the two
ratios.
Table 5 shows that lead banks of in-state
MBHCs tend to lend the same percent of deposits
as comparable independent banks, while the other
two groups of MBHC banks tend to lend a smaller
percent of deposits than their peers. The average
loan-deposit ratio at lead banks of in-state MBHCs
is 6.0 percent, about the same as for comparable
independent banks. For other banks owned by in-
state MBHCs, the average loan-deposit ratio is 5.5
percent, 1.0 percentage point below the average for
comparable independent banks. Banks owned by
out-of-state MBHCs differ the most from their
peers. The average loan-deposit ratio for this group
is only 4.7 percent, 1.8 percentage points below the
average for comparable independent banks. For
Table 5
Average Ratio of Small C&I Loans to Deposits
Banks owned by MBHCs
Type of bank Average ratio Average peer ratio Average difference
Banks owned by 
in-state MBHCs
Lead banks 6.0 6.0 -.1 
Other banks 5.5 6.5 -1.0*
Banks owned by 
out-of-state MBHCs 4.7 6.6 -1.8*
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
Note: For each bank, the peer ratio is the estimated mean loan-deposit ratio for comparable independent banks. See text
for further details.
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the average difference from comparable inde-
pendent banks is statistically significant.
Table 6 shows that the tendency for non-lead
banks and banks owned by out-of-state MBHCs to
lend less than their peers is widespread but far from
universal. As in Table 4, the first column shows the
percent of banks with higher loan-deposit ratios
than their peers, while the second column shows the
percent with lower ratios than their peers.
19 Among
lead banks of in-state MBHCs, half have higher
ratios than their peers and half have lower ratios,
confirming that these banks behave much the same
as independent banks. Other banks owned by in-state
MBHCs stand out more from their peers. Among
this group, less than 40 percent have higher loan-
deposit ratios than comparable independent
banks,  while more than 60 percent have lower loan
ratios. Banks owned by out-of-state MBHCs show
the greatest difference from independent banks,
with 2 1/2 times as many banks reporting lower
ratios than their peers as reporting higher ratios.
Even in this group, however, more than a quarter
of the banks loaned more to small businesses than
their peers, showing there were many exceptions to
the rule.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence on small business lending at dis-
trict banks confirms the finding of earlier surveys
that multi-office banks tend to lend less to small
businesses than other banks. Specifically, the data
show that banks with a high degree of branching,
smaller banks of in-state MBHCs, and banks owned
by out-of-state MBHCs all tend to lend a smaller
proportion of their funds to small businesses than
other banks. To be sure, there are many exceptions
to the rule, and the data cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that multi-office banks lend less to small busi-
nesses partly because they acquire banks that
already make few such loans. Nevertheless, the
results support the view that further growth in multi-
office banking may impose costs on some small
businesses.
Table 6
Distribution of Small C&I Loan-Deposit Ratio 






Banks owned by in-state MBHCs
Lead banks 50 50
Other banks 38 62
Banks owned by 
out-of-state MBHCs 29 71
Note: For each bank, the peer ratio is the estimated median loan-deposit ratio for comparable independent banks. See text
for further details.
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office banking should be curtailed. First, the costs
to small businesses may be only temporary because
other banks may step in and fill any lending gap left
by multi-office banks. Suppose, for example, that a
small bank absorbed by a large multi-office organi-
zation makes fewer small business loans because
the head office imposes overly rigid credit criteria
or siphons deposits from the bank. Then other banks
in the community can be expected to increase their
own lending or new banks can be expected to enter
the market, leaving total credit to local businesses
unchanged. 
Second, the costs of multi-office banking to
small businesses may be outweighed by other bene-
fits. There is substantial evidence that multi-office
banking improves service to depositors and in-
creases competition in local markets (Calem).
Multi-office banking also makes banks less vulner-
able to downturns in the local economy by helping
them diversify their loan portfolios. The resulting
increase in bank safety benefits taxpayers by reduc-
ing the chance of deposit insurance losses. And, it
increases the ability of banks to maintain lending
during periods of economic stress, helping soften
local recessions.
Rather than justifying curbs on multi-office
banking, the results of this article underscore the
importance of keeping local banking markets com-
petitive (General Accounting Office). Regulators
should continue to use the tools at their disposal to
ensure that multi-office banks do not dominate local
markets by absorbing smaller banks. These tools
include the right to disapprove anticompetitive merg-
ers or to require merging banks to divest themselves
of some offices. Further progress should also be
made in reducing regulatory reporting burdens, which
tend to hurt small banks more than large banks.
Such measures should preserve the benefits of
multi-office banking, while helping guarantee that
smaller banks can step in and satisfy any legitimate
credit needs unmet by large multi-office banks.
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ratio was first regressed against measures of the bank’s total
deposits, location, and holding company status. This
regression was then used to estimate the peer ratio for each
branch bank—the loan-deposit ratio the bank would be
predicted to have if it behaved the same as a collection of unit
banks operating in the same markets, holding similar amounts
of deposits in each market, and having the same MBHC
status. Statistical significance was determined from the
variance-covariance matrix of the prediction errors.
16 In Table 4, the loan-deposit ratio of each branch bank is
compared to the estimated median ratio for comparable unit
banks. Because the distribution of loan-deposit ratios is skewed
to the right, the median loan-deposit ratio for unit banks was
less than the mean and the median regression residual was
negative. Accordingly, for each branch bank, the median
loan-deposit ratio for comparable unit banks was estimated
by taking the estimated mean loan-deposit ratio for
comparable unit banks and adding the median regression
residual. 
17 Of the 494 district banks owned by in-state MBHCs in June
1994, 111 were lead banks.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 5518 The peer ratio was estimated essentially the same way as
in Table 3. For all independent banks in the sample, the
loan-deposit ratio was first regressed against measures of the
bank’s average deposits per market, distribution of deposits
across markets, and degree of branching. This regression was
then used to estimate the peer ratio for each MBHC bank—the
loan-deposit ratio the bank would be predicted to have if it
behaved the same as independent banks with the same average
deposits per market, the same distribution of deposits across
markets, and the same degree of branching. As before, statistical
significance was determined from the variance-covariance
matrix of the prediction errors. 
19 In Table 6, the loan-deposit ratio of each MBHC bank is
compared to the estimated median ratio for comparable
independent banks. As in Table 4, this median was computed
by taking the estimated mean ratio for comparable independent
banks and adding the median regression residual.
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